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I. Updating the Statutes 
That Establish Regulation 
The Spring of 1983 is an appropriate time to take stock of progress on 
regulatory reform and to develop the future agenda. What has been 
accomplished? It is clear that significant and perhaps fundamental im-
provements have been made in recent years in controlling the flow of new 
regulations. A series of Presidential directives in three administrations, 
culminating in Executive Order 12291 of February 17, 1981, has estab-
lished a comprehensive and fairly effective system for reviewing pending 
rulemaking. A major advance has been the incorporation of formal 
benefit-cost analysis in the review process. The Reagan Administration 
has estimated that its reviews to date have reduced the cost of compliance 
with federal regulation by $9-11 billion in terms of capital outlays, and $6 
billion a year on a continuing basis. 
Surely, additional improvements in administrative procedures are 
desirable and possible. Benefit-cost analysis is a developing mechanism, 
especially as it is applied to regulation. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, 
at this point, the major obstacles to further substantial improvement in 
the regulatory process are the requirements and limitations in the basic 
statutes governing regulatory activities. After all, every regulation is 
issued pursuant to an act of Congress and every regulator is paid from a 
congressional appropriation. 
Recent experience confirms the belief that the fundamental short-
comings of government regulation result more from statutory than from 
executive deficiencies. For example, the current leadership of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration has been trying to reduce the 
burdens of its rule-making. However, the courts have struck down several 
specific changes on the grounds that the proposals were inconsistent with 
the statute under which the agency operates. The inherent desirability of 
OSHA's proposals seems clear-to achieve health and safety objectives in 
a more cost-effective manner. Thus, revisions in the law now inhibiting 
such improvements become high priorities. 
In general, laws that mandate the pursuit of unrealistic goals or unrea-
sonable methods for social regulation are attractive candidates for 
revision. Such regulation ranges from the "zero discharge" goal of the 
Clean Water Act to the "zero risk" provision of the Delaney Amendment 
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The expiration of the Clean Air Act 
and Clean Water Act provides striking opportunities for incorporating 
desirable changes along these lines. Surely, recent experiences in the 
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environmental area demonstrate the need for regulators to conform to 
existing statutes, whatever their shortcomings may be. That experience 
also points up the need to update statutory requirements rather than 
introduce arbitrary administrative changes. 
In the area of economic regulation, we have seen in the case of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board that statutory change is the most effective means of 
pursuing a deregulation strategy. Other candidates exist in the array of 
economic regulatory agencies that abound in Washington. In general, the 
emphasis in any deregulation approach should be on proposed laws that 
phase out economic controls which interfere with competition in the 
marketplace. Many of the existing regulatory agencies, especially in the 
transportation and energy areas, either create artificial monopolies or 
otherwise inhibit the operation of the basic market forces that truly 
protect the consumer. 
The major obstacles to further improvement in the 
regulatory process are the requirements and limitations 
in the basic statutes governing regulatory activities. 
During the past year, especially, it also has become apparent that 
onerous federal intervention is not limited to domestic economic activity. 
It also covers much of this nation's international trade and investment 
flows. A variety of often interrelated tax, regulatory, and programmatic 
laws restricts either our imports or our exports. 
Without underestimating in any way the importance of improving ad-
ministrative review of existing as well as proposed regulations, the present 
time is appropriate for embarking on a second phase of regulatory 
reform: the review and revision of the substantive laws governing the reg-
ulatory process. In this report we focus on statutory problems in the 
following key areas: 
1. The environment, specifically renewal of the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act. 
2. Occupational health and safety. 
3. Surface transportation, with a view toward deregulation. 
4. Energy, also with a view toward deregulation. 
5. Foreign trade, focusing on the renewal of the Export 
Administration Act. 
6. Banking, notably the McFadden Act. 
7. Marketing practices, specifically the Federal Trade Commission. 
Federal outlays to operate regulatory activities 
will total $6.5 billion in 1984, more than 
eight times the sum spent in 1970. 
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Greater attention is also needed to the process whereby Congress enacts 
the appropriations that finance regulatory activities. Because the individ-
ual regulatory programs are dispersed all through government, it is hard 
for Congress to see the totality of resources involved. As shown in greater 
detail in Part II of this report, federal outlays to operate regulatory activi-
ties will total $6.5 billion in 1984, more than eight times the sum spent in 
1970. When the data are converted to dollars of constant purchasing 
power (see Table 1), a more than three-fold increase is seen to have taken 
place since 1970. This amount, of course, is dwarfed by the much larger 
sums expended in the private sector and by state and local governments to 
comply with the directives of federal regulatory agencies. 
TABLE 1 
Regulatory Outlays in Brief 
(Fiscal Years, in Billions) 
Current Constant 1970 
Year Dollars Dollars 
1970 $0.8 $0.8 
1975 3.2 2.3 
1980 5.9 3.0 
1981 6.5 3.0 
1982 6.2 2.7 
1983 6.4 2.7 
1984 6.5 2.6 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business. See Table 5. 
As a start to an improved information base, it would be helpful if a 
comprehensive tabulation of the expenditures of all federal regulatory 
programs be added to the Special Analyses volume that accompanies the 
annual U.S. budget document. Meanwhile, Parts II and III of this report 
are designed to fill that gap. 
Within the context of statutory reform, the selection of new appointees 
to regulatory agencies is a related and vitally important function. The ex-
periences of recent years in several administrations demonstrate the need 
to select people who take a balanced approach to the benefits and burdens 
of regulation. 
Appointing uncritical enthusiasts for expansion of government regula-
tion inevitably produces a regulatory regime characterized by excessive 
burdens and cavalier disregard of economic impacts. Similarly, regulators 
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who lack a basic sympathy toward the programs they administer-or 
who, through lack of sensitivity, project such a negative image-are also 
counterproductive. . . 
Regulatory activities that are deemed worthy of co?tmuat10n sh~uld be 
managed by people who are both sympathetic t? the ~~p~r~ant social ob-
jectives to be achieved and equally concerned With mimmizmg the burdens 
they impose on individual citizens as taxpayers and consumers. The. l~~d­
ership of regulatory agencies-as well as of other governmental activ~ties 
-should understand that good policymaking means a careful balancmg 
of a variety of important considerations-such as clean air an~ ~igh 
employment, healthier working conditions and greater productivity. 
Today, however, the most urgent need is to convince mem?ers of Co.n-
gress to demonstrate such a sense of balance when they wnte the basic 
regulatory laws. 
The leadership of regulatory agencies should 
understand that good policymaking means a careful 
balancing of a variety of important considerations. 
Environmental Regulation 
Amid the urgent and at times strident concern for improved environ-
mental quality that characterized the past decade, imp?rta?t economic. fac-
tors frequently got lost in the rush to regulate. In considermg changes m the 
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, the primary issue is not whether 
environmental controls are needed. Rather, it is how to improve the effec-
tiveness of the billions of dollars expended each year on pollution abate-
ment and control. Unfortunately, that important goal has been obscured by 
the plethora of disturbing reports on administrative shortcomings i~ E~ A. 
In retrospect, many of those administrative problems aros~ from misgmded 
attempts to work around extremely onerous statutory reqmrem~nts. The 
undramatic but serious business of environmental cleanup reqmres atten-
tion to be focused on those shortcomings in existing law. 
Revising the Clean Air Act . 
The Clean Air Act is one of the most costly pieces of regulatory legisla-
tion in history. Its incremental costs-expenditures beyond those that the 
private sector would voluntarily spend-totale~ $22 billion in 19~9. Ac-
cording to the Council on Environmental Quality ~CEQ), exp~nditures of 
nearly $300 billion will be needed to meet Clean Air Act reqmrements dur-
ing the period 1979 to 1988 (measured in 1979 dollars). The ~nnual ~?st for 
air pollution control, paid by the consumer in the form of higher utility 
rates and higher prices for goods and services, amounted to $400 for a 
family of four in 1979. 
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Clean air regulation generates additional costs to the economy that are 
not captured in CEQ estimates. These effects include increased construction 
costs due to delays in granting permits, lags in initiating new projects due to 
potential environmental challenges, and reduced progress in reaching the 
goal of increasing U.S. energy independence. 
The undramatic but serious business of 
environmental cleanup requires focusing 
attention on the shortcomings of existing law. 
Lags in productivity-enhancing investment caused by clean air regulations 
interfere with the achievement of the goals of the Clean Air Act itself. In 
areas where air quality is better than the national standards (designated as 
Prevention of Significant Deterio~ation areas), delays of two and sometimes 
three years in obtaining building permits are commonplace, resulting in 
greatly increased construction costs. For example, it now takes eight to ten 
years to construct a 1 ,000-megawatt coal-fired power plant, whereas it took 
only four to five years to construct such a facility a decade ago. More than 
half the $1 billion cost of such an installation is due to requirements for 
scrubbers and the interest and related expenses incurred during the four- to 
five-year period of extra delay. 
But, in addition, these delays postpone the time when aging, less effi-
cient, and more polluting factories can be replaced with more productive 
and less polluting new facilities. In this way, some of the provisions of the 
Clean Air Act are self-defeating-retarding efforts to reduce air pollution. 
The following changes in the Clean Air Act would produce a salutary 
effect on the economy without sacrificing air quality objectives crucial to 
public health: 
(1) EPA should be required to establish standards that will 
protect the public against ''unreasonable risk of adverse 
health effects." In determining "unreasonable risk," 
the EPA administrator should be required to consider 
the nature and extent of the risk, the attainability of the 
standard, economic values, and other important public 
interests. 
(2) Secondary (non-health-related) air standards should be 
set by individual states. 
(3) "Prevention of Significant Deterioration increments" 
for allowable air quality degradation should apply to 
national park areas only (Class I areas). 
(4) All mandated control technologies should follow the 
procedures for ''best available control technology'' (BACT). 
(5) States should be allowed to substitute emission fees for 
current offset procedures in nonattainment areas. In 
general, market incentives should be substituted for 
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command and control regulation when possible. The 
need for statutory change is underscored by the recent 
ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia that innovations such as the "bubble 
concept" -treating pollutants for a whole plant rather 
than by individual smokestacks-are "impermissible" 
according to current law. . 
(6) Deadlines for attainment, and concomitant construction 
ban penalties, should be eliminated. Such requirements 
are clearly unrealistic; approximately 150 counties are 
currently threatened by legal requirements to impose 
such a ban. (7) An independent scientific review of mobile source emis-
sion standards should be commissioned immediately, 
since more restrictive auto pollution control costs ap-
pear to far outweigh potential health benefits. 
(8) New emission sources and modified sources should not 
be required to install additional control equipment -ab-
sent newly discovered health threats-within ten years 
of installation of approved equipment to control a par-
ticular pollutant. 
(9) Research on the causes of "acid rain" should be ac-
celerated. No inflexible legislative requirements should 
be set without sufficient scientific evidence and 
cost/benefit analysis. 
America's resources are vast but not unlimited. We can indeed afford 
to protect our citizens from unreasonable exposure to unhealthful air 
pollutants. But it is imperative that the laws governing how we accomp-
lish this important task be designed to encourage the most effective and 
least disruptive means of achieving these important environmental objec-
tives. Reauthorization of the Clean Air Act gives Congress the opportun-
ity to do just that. 
Revising the Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act, like its costly cousin the Clean Air Act, was 
scheduled to be reauthorized or revised by October 1, 1981. But it remains 
unchanged to date. The Act appears to have arrested the degradation of 
water quality. Yet the evidence that it has actually improved water quality 
is largely anecdotal. There is no doubt, however, that the Act has been 
costly. According to the latest published figures from the Council on En-
vironmental Quality (CEQ), incremental costs for industries and 
municipalities totaled over $12 billion in 1979-$6 billion in public spen-
ding (financed by taxpayers) and more than $6 billion in private expen-
ditures (paid by consumers). The CEQ report for 1980 also estimated that 
the cumulative incremental costs for the period 1979-1988 will total nearly 
$170 billion. 
The two primary goals of the Clean Water Act (established in the 1972 
law) are to: 1) eliminate the discharge of pollutants by 1985, and 2) make 
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Evidence that the Clean Water Act has actually 
improved water quality is largely anecdotal. There is no 
doubt, however, that the Act has been costly. 
all lakes and streams fishable and swimmable by July 1, 1983. Both goals 
are widely acknowledged by environmentalists, as well as by regulators and 
regulated parties, to be unattainable. Since these are goals and not legal re-
quirements, supporters of the current law see no need to change them. 
Nonetheless, unrealistic goals do have consequences. For instance, recent 
efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency to allow more state control 
over designation of the use of a particular stream has been challenged on 
the grounds that it is an abandonment of the "fishable/swimmable" goal. 
The existing legislation, last amended in 1977, is very complex. But many 
of the technical difficulties that municipal treatment plants and private in-
dustry are experiencing in complying with the act elicit a ''ho hum'' 
response from the public and Congress. Thus far, it has been the public 
sector rather than the private sector that has been faced with the greatest 
problems in meeting effluent requirements. Although it is widely agreed 
that 96 percent of industry is in compliance with current guidelines, 
estimates of municipal compliance vary widely-from 50 percent to 75 per-
cent. One General Accounting Office sampling of 242 new and modified 
municipal waste treatment plants taken in November 1980 found 87 percent 
were violating effluent limits and 31 percent were in ''serious violation.'' 
Three primary Clean Water Act requirements will create much confusion 
if not modified soon. First of all, the July 1, 1984, deadline for installation 
of Best Available Technology (BAT) for toxic pollutants and Best Conven-
tional Technology (BCT) for conventional pollutants cannot be met. 
According to the Act, the EPA must specify BAT for 129 toxic substances 
used in 34 different industries. Thus far the agency has been able to pro-
mulgate regulations for only 3 industries-inorganic chemicals, timber pro-
cessing, and iron and steel. In short, deadlines for advanced technology 
controls cannot be met by industry, public waste treatment authorities, or 
the EPA itself. 
Furthermore, rigidly proceeding to new, more costly standards may not 
be necessary in many cases. Current cleanup methods for conventional 
pollutants have proved to be effective for removing a high percentage of 
heavy metals and other taxies. In light of these facts, the deadlines should 
be extended to July 1, 1988, as EPA has urged. 
The 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act also require ''pretreat-
ment" of toxic substances that are discharged by industry into publicly 
owned treatment works. National categorical standards are required for 
129 taxies and 34 industries. But only requirements for electroplaters and 
timber products have been set to date. Industry, the EPA, and the U.S. 
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Review of the Committee on Public 
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Works and Transportation all concur that this approach should be aban-
doned in favor of local control over usage of sewage facilities on the basis 
of the current permitting system. 
Deadlines for advanced technology controls 
cannot be met by industry, public waste 
treatment authorities, or the EPA itself 
The third major Clean Water Act provision needing immediate revision is 
the permitting system itself, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System. Between 1972 and 1976, EPA and the states issued approximately 
65,000 "first round," five-year permits based on Best Practicable 
Technology. The second round of permits were to be based upon the more 
stringent Best Available Technology (BAT) requirements. Thus far 30,400 
permits have expired. Over the next three years, the remainder of first 
round permits will expire. According to recent Congressional testimony by 
the Deputy Administrator of EPA, ''with 5-year permits the backlog can 
never be reduced at current permit issuing levels. Before the permitting 
authority can complete permit issuance of existing expired permits, the 
reissued 5-year permits will begin expiring once again." The EPA, industry, 
and the House Oversight Subcommittee recommend that permits should 
have a longer life-eight to ten years. 
An alternative and more fundamental reform of the Clean Water Act 
would make it a market-based system. Rather than specifying effluent 
standards based upon some presumed level of technology, the EPA (or the 
state permitting authority) would levy a tax (or effluent charge) per unit of 
effluent. This approach would use the price system to provide the incentive 
for reducing pollution. The price system would stimulate innovation in 
pollution abatement techniques and would be more cost-effective. 
Although both business and government tend to favor uniform standards 
over economic incentives, economic approaches to pollution problems can 
produce savings for taxpayers and consumers. A study of the Delaware 
Estuary, for example, showed that effluent fees could achieve the desired 
level of water purity for dissolved oxygen at half the cost of the conven-
tional approach. The Washington representative of the Sierra Club has 
been quoted as saying, "In retrospect, we would have accomplished more if 
we'd simply taxed pollution and then left compliance in the hands of busi-
nessmen rather than regulators.'' 
"In retrospect, we would have accomplished 
more if we'd simply taxed pollution and 
then left compliance in the hands of businessmen 
rather than regulators. " 
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Regulation of Job Health and Safety 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 created one of the most 
controversial of all federal agencies. Many critics have contended that 
OSHA has pursued the wrong goal-focusing on the details of on-the-job 
safety rather than improving occupational health. In addition, the agency 
has been criticized for using the wrong tools in applying broad, standards-
based regulations rather than using a flexible, incentives approach. 
Perhaps the most damning criticism of OSHA is that, although it im-
poses large costs on the private sector, it has accomplished little in the way 
of improving the conditions in which Americans work. Table 2 illustrates 
the trends in injuries, illnesses, and fatalities since 1972, the first year in 
which the agency was operational. The number of job-related illnesses and 
injuries per worker has been rising during this period, as has the number of 
lost workdays. The annual number of workplace fatalities has fluctuated 
without any visible trend. 
TABLE2 
Worker Serious Injury and Illness and 
Accident Fatality Rates 
Year Lost Workday Cases Lost Workdays Total 
(per 100 full-time (per 100 full- Workplace 
workers) time workers) Fatalities 
1972 3.3 47.7 n/a 
1973 3.4 53.3 5700 
1974 3.5 54.6 5850 
1975 3.3 56.1 5160 
1976 3.5 60.5 4480 
1977 3.8 61.6 5560 
1978 4.1 63.5 5490 
1979 4.3 67.7 5850 
1980 4.0 65.2 5360 
Average 
Annual 
Increase: 2.3o/o 3.6% 
n/a = not available 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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After a shaky start, dominated by the promulgation of a host of silly 
and nitpicking regulations, OSHA began to streamline its regulations. 
This change has reduced the day-to-day complaints on the part of those 
regulated. Yet the fundamental statutory shortcomings remain. If anything, 
they are now more visible. 
Key sections of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act 
that deserve attention are the following: 
• Section 3(8) of the Act defines an ''occupational safety 
and health standard'' as a standard or regulation that is 
''reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe and 
healthful employment." 
• Section 6(b )(5) directs the Secretary of Labor to ''set the 
standard which most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that 
no employee will suffer material impairment of health or 
functional capacity.'' 
Because these sections are largely subjective, OSHA regulations have 
been widely challenged, and often overturned, in the courts. The following 
is a partial list of cases in which OSHA standards were ruled either techno-
logically impracticable, economically infeasible, or both: 
Love Box Co. (1975) 
Reynolds Metals Co. (1976) 
Continental Can (1976) 
West Point Pepperell, Inc. (1977) 
Castle and Cook Foods (1977) 
Turner Company (1977) 
RMI Company (1979) 
American Petroleum Institute ( 1980) 
American Textile Manufacturers (1981) 
One of the more recent of these cases, Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, et. al., is a good example of 
the opinions the courts have handed down on OSHA matters. In this case, 
because of the well-documented causal relationship between contact with 
benzene and developing leukemia, then Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall 
reduced the standard maximum level allowed from 10 parts to 1 part ben-
zene per million parts of air. However, the research linking airborne 
benzene contamination to leukemia had been conducted at levels of 400 
ppm or higher. A group of manufacturers, led by the American Petroleum 
Institute, challenged the case in court. A lower court held that the standard 
was "invalid because it was based on findings unsupported by the admini-
strative record." The Supreme Court upheld the judgment. 
Perhaps the most damning criticism of OSHA is that it has 
accomplished little in the way of improving 
the conditions in which Americans work. 
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The implicit reasoning of the Justices who affirmed the lower court's rul-
ing was that the benefits of the reduction simply did not justify its cost. 
Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
When the administrative record reveals only scant or minimal 
risk of material health impairment, responsible administra-
tion calls for avoidance of extravagant, comprehensive 
regulation. Perfect safety is a chimera; regulation must not 
strangle human activity in the search for the impossible. 
Justice Powell wrote: 
... it is simply unreasonable to believe that Congress intended 
OSHA to pursue the desirable goal of risk-free workplaces to 
the extent that the economic viability of particular in-
dustries ... is threatened .... Although one might wish that 
Congress had spoken with greater clarity, the legislative 
history and purposes of the statute do not support OSHA's 
interpretation of the Act. 
The lesson to be learned is that the vagueness of the OSHA statute is 
now the problem which must be addressed. The urgent need to revise the 
statute was sharply illustrated in another Supreme Court case, American 
Textile Manufacturers v. Donovan. In March 1981, OSHA announced its 
intention to review the existing standard of worker exposure to airborne 
cotton dust, relying on an a~alysis of the costs and benefits of such a 
standard. At the same time, OSHA examined the usefulness of cost-benefit 
analysis in general, partly in response to the benzene decision. In June 
1981, the Supreme Court effectively prohibited using benefit/ cost analysis 
for such purposes. The implication is that, under the current statute, 
OSHA must uniformly apply the most stringent standards that will still 
allow the firm involved to operate. In the opinion of the Justices: 
Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits ... 
that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress 
would be inconsistent with the command [of the Act]. Thus, 
cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute 
because feasibility analysis is. 
The statement that cost-benefit analysis is not required under the existing 
statute means that, in formulating new standards, it will not be allowed. 
The ambiguous phrasing of the Act itself is to blame, not the agency 
created under this law. The court opinions in these various cases are 
singularly unhelpful in establishing a consistent approach to regulation of 
the workplace. On the one hand, OSHA is forced to take feasibility into ac-
count, but ~:m the other, it is prohibited from explicitly using cost-benefit 
analysis in that accounting. Clearly, the underlying statute needs to be 
made more explicit. The revision should embody three modifications: 
(1) Change the basic role of OSHA from that of a legal 
adversary, making inspections and insisting on com-
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pliance with complex detailed standards, to a safety 
leader. Such an organization should investigate new 
techniques in safety engineering, publish and disseminate 
information, and assist the safety departments of in-
dividual firms in solving their specific problems. 
(2) Make explicit what is ''reasonable'' and ''feasible'' by 
allowing decisions to be made on the basis of a com-
parison of the benefits to workers to the compliance 
costs. Such analyses should include the explicit costs of 
safety equipment, and the implicit but substantial costs 
of the paperwork burdens of technical compliance. 
(3) Shift the basic orientation of enforcement from 
punishing employers if workers do not comply to a 
shared system of incentives, encouraging cooperation and 
flexibility in responding to specific job-safety problems. 
From the viewpoint of legislators, the courts, and OSHA itself, these 
changes will allow a much more effective pursuit of the ultimate goal: 
improving the safety and health conditions in which American men and 
women work. 
Surface Transportation Regulation 
The traditional regulation of surface transportation-which includes the 
railroad, trucking, freight forwarder, bus, and maritime industries-has no 
justification in today's economy. The tremendous development of technol-
ogy since the Interstate Commerce Commission was established in 1887 has 
resulted in very substantial competition among different modes of transpor-
tation-by airplanes, passenger automobiles, buses, trucks, inland barges, 
ocean-going ships, and railroads. Originally, transportation regulation may 
have been justified by the argument that competition was limited and that 
the consumers needed to be protected by government from the ''mono-
polistic" power of individual carriers. 
The traditional regulation of surface transportation has no 
justification in today 's economy. 
Whatever factual basis that argument may have had, it is apparent that 
competition for passenger and freight business is now very keen. Indeed, 
many economists and political scientists have pointed out that the regula-
tory agencies themselves have become legal cartels thwarting competition 
in the regulated industries. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the 
regulated carriers have often come to support this type of regulation as a 
means of keeping out new competitors. Of course, consumers benefit 
from the freedom of companies to enter or leave the industry. As shown 
in the recent case of air transportation deregulation, competition in the 
marketplace is the most effective way of keeping prices down. 
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The case for retiring the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 
Federal Maritime Commission is now a compelling one. Not only are the 
basic restrictions on entry and exit counterproductive in today's economy, 
but the more detailed regulations are not needed either. For example, in 
the case of the ICC, restrictions on one type of carrier owning another are 
no longer justified. Railroads should, if they so desire, be allowed to 
acquire trucking companies in order to facilitate container and piggyback 
operations. 
Also, limitations on exit-abandonments of franchises to provide 
service-should be eliminated. As a result of intermodal competition, 
excessive capacity exists, especially in parts of the railroad industry. It 
makes no sense for the federal government to insist that a company 
continue to provide service on an uneconomical route and then face the 
need to subsidize the company to avoid its going bankrupt. 
Cabotage laws push up living costs in Alaska and 
Hawaii and make Oregon lumber more expensive in 
California than Canadian lumber. 
The appointment of more enlightened members of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission has resulted in less onerous regulations. But the 
basic mission of the agency-to control entry, exit, and rates-is 
counterproductive. The Interstate ,Commerce Act of 1887, as amended, 
should be phased out on an orderly basis. During the transition to full 
deregulation, the law should be amended to require the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to grant within 90 days all requests for abandon-
ing money-losing, little-used branch railroad lines. Recent experience with 
the partial deregulation of railroads and trucking-achieved through the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 and the Staggers Rail Act-shows favorable 
results in terms of improved service and lower costs to users. Despite 
concerns expressed earlier, most smaller towns have continued to be 
served by one or more modes of transportation. 
Similarly, there is no justification for the continuance of the federal 
maritime laws which established the Federal Maritime Commission and 
authorize it to regulate American shipping engaged in foreign commerce 
or in U.S. coastal trade. The Commission devotes much of its energy to 
investigating price rebating and rate-cutting. By requiring U.S. carriers to 
abide by rates set in international rate conference agreements-under a 
waiver of the antitrust laws-the Commission limits the ability of our 
carriers to meet price competition from companies outside the United 
States. Reliance on the competitive forces of the marketplace will ensure 
more efficient and less costly ocean transportation. 
Similarly, the cabotage laws (such as the Jones Act), which restrict 
shipping between American ports to U.S. flag ships, should be repealed. 
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These restrictions on competition have many adverse side effects. For 
example, they push up living costs in Alaska and Hawaii and tend to 
make Oregon lumber more expensive in California than Canadian 
lumber. 
Deregulation will ultimately reduce costs for 
consumers, both as travelers and as purchasers of 
products whose prices reflect costs of transportation. 
All barriers to entry into the surface transportation sector of the 
economy should be eliminated. Any individual or company that wishes to 
risk capital should be free to offer services at whatever rates the market 
justifies. Competition will protect both the shipper and the traveler. Firms 
that try to exploit shippers or passengers will quickly face competition 
from companies that are attracted to that segment of the market. Deregu-
lation will ultimately reduce costs for consumers, both as travelers and as 
purchasers of products whose prices reflect costs of transportation. 
Energy Price Regulation 
Recent history is instructive in the case of energy price deregulation. 
Despite the howls of outrage at the time, the elimination by President 
Reagan of price and allocation controls over gasoline and petroleum 
products has been followed, with the inevitable lag, by lower-not 
higher-prices. The deregulation of natural gas, which would require 
Congress to amend or repeal the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, is likely 
to have favorable results similar to those resulting from petroleum 
deregulation. 
Still, under present law, high-priced natural gas is being imported from 
Canada even though cheaper U.S. supplies are in surplus. The problems 
in the gas market have been caused by the interaction of federal price con-
trols and inflexible contracts between pipeline companies and producers. 
The contracts, in turn, were by-products of the long and convoluted 
history of government regulation of energy. 
The basic problem is that federal regulation is too rigid to allow gas 
prices to reflect changing conditions. Natural gas prices are now at levels 
that have encouraged switching back to oil. With so much of the industry's 
capacity idle, it is unlikely that we would see the sharp runup in prices 
that some fear would result if natural gas were deregulated. 
Realistic prices are the most effective 
stimulus to energy conservation. Deregulation 
of natural gas is long overdue. 
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The Natural Gas Policy Act was designed to raise the wellhead prices of 
natural gas in order to achieve a balance between supply and demand in 
1988. But the legislation specified gradual price increases for various 
categories of natural gas, based on a projected price of oil that today is 
still considerably lower than current oil prices. The price disparity has 
prompted new inefficiencies in the allocation and consumption of natural 
gas. The smooth transition to a deregulated market envisioned by the 
framers of the Act may not occur unless Congress overrides the many 
contracts which have been entered into on the basis of the 1978 Act. 
In restrospect, the elaborate approach of the 1978 law did not protect 
consumers. A series of nearly 25 different price ceilings for various cate-
gories of natural gas, in practice, provided incentives to producers to drill 
for the most expensive, highest-cost types of new supply. That network of 
price controls actually penalized increased production from lower-cost 
supplies. 
The sooner that Congress eliminates price controls over natural gas, the 
sooner the adjustments to a competitive market will take place. It is clear 
that the problems associated with deregulation arise only because the fed-
eral government has interfered for so many years with the operation of 
competitive market forces in the energy sector of the American economy. 
The sooner that domestic energy prices equal world market prices, the 
sooner will new domestic sources-conventional and unconventional, 
including synthetic fuel, solar energy, etc.-become competitive. Realistic 
prices are the most effective stimulus to energy conservation. Deregula-
tion of natural gas prices is long overdue. 
Regulation of Exports 
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) expires at the end of 
September 1983 and can benefit from revision. This legislation gives the 
President the authority to impose controls on exports from the United 
States for either national security or foreign policy reasons. National 
security controls restrict exports of goods and technology which have 
military applications and, thus, could threaten the national security of the 
United States. Foreign policy restrictions, on the other hand, are very 
vaguely defined-those considered necessary by the President to further 
the foreign policy of the United States. 
While a considerable consensus exists in the United States on the need 
for export controls for national security reasons, this agreement does not 
extend to controls imposed to achieve foreign policy objectives. Critics 
maintain that the imposition of controls on exports of U.S. firms for for-
eign policy reasons has resulted in the loss of export markets for the 
United States without any offsetting political advantages. The debate over 
the renewal of the EAA is focusing to a large degree on limiting the scope 
of Presidential authority to impose these controls. Much of that debate is 
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the outgrowth of the decision by the Reagan Administration to impose 
sanctions during December 1981 on exports of equipment to the Soviet 
Union used in the construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline. These sanc-
tions were initially imposed in response to the declaration of martial law 
in Poland. 
Controls on exports for foreign policy reasons have 
resulted in the loss of export markets for the United 
States without any offsetting political advantages. 
The Reagan Administration generated further controversy when, in 
June 1982, the sanctions were extended to cover European subsidiaries of 
American multinationals and European companies producing goods under 
American licenses which were to be used in the construction of the pipe-
line. The Reagan Administration used the authority granted under the 
EAA to impose both sets of sanctions. The imposition of these sanctions 
strained economic and political relations between the United States and 
Europe. None of the European countries involved agreed to adhere to the 
sanctions. In addition, U.S. firms lost several million dollars worth of 
contracts. Despite these costs, there is no indication that the sanctions ac-
tually hindered the construction of the pipeline, and they have been lifted. 
The success of export controls depends heavily on other suppliers 
withholding the sale of goods and technologies to the adversary, typically 
Eastern bloc countries. The sale of goods with military applications is 
regulated on an international basis by the Coordinating Committee 
(Cocom), which consists of the NATO countries (excluding Iceland) and 
Japan. The restriction lists agreed to by Cocom help to ensure that other 
Western countries do not provide the Soviet Union with military tech-
nology withheld by the United States. 
Without some consensus among the Western trading 
partners of the Soviet Union, sanctions unilaterally 
imposed by one country are generally ineffective. 
No such agreement, however, exists to coordinate restrictions on the 
sale of non-strategic goods. Without some consensus among the Western 
trading partners of the Soviet Union, sanctions unilaterally imposed by 
one country are generally ineffective. The difficulty that the United States 
has in reaching an agreement with Western European countries and Japan 
over trade with the Soviet Union is, in part, due to differences among 
these countries in the perception of the relationship between politics and 
trade. European countries (with the exception of West Germany) tend to 
consider politics and trade to be two distinct activities which can be kept 
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separate. In contrast, the first post-war U.S. legislation regulating trade 
with the Soviet Union, the Export Control Act of 1949, gave the Pres-
ident authority to embargo trade which would contribute to either the 
military or economic potential of the Soviet Union. Thus, any trade with 
the Soviet Union which would help the country economically was also 
considered to be of military benefit. 
U.S. policy did not change until Congress passed the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1969, a law that explicitly allowed for trade in products 
which could contribute to the economic potential of the Soviet Union. 
The Act retained strict controls on goods which would contribute to the 
USSR's military strength. In using these controls, however, the President 
was required to take into account the availability of the product from 
alternative suppliers. The 1979 renewal of the Act includes procedural 
changes to expedite the granting of export licenses. The 1979 Act also 
explicitly states that improvement should be made in the administration 
of U.S. trade with the Soviet Union to reduce the uncertainty in export 
controls and to encourage trade. 
The Act, however, leaves the President with considerable discretion to 
restrict trade for foreign policy purposes. Prior to establishing the con-
trols, the President is required to demonstrate how the restrictions would 
achieve the intended foreign policy goals. He must also take into account 
four other factors: (1) the reaction of other countries to the imposition of 
controls by the U.S., (2) the likely effects of the controls on the export 
performance of the U.S., (3) the ability of the U.S. to impose the controls 
effectively, and (4) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing the 
controls. 
The overall ineffectiveness of these sanctions in achieving foreign policy 
objectives brings into question whether the President should be granted 
the authority to use export controls as a foreign policy instrument. The 
failure of the sanctions also raises questions of extraterritoriality and 
whether the U.S. should regulate sales by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
firms. 
Many business groups believe that export controls are often nullified by 
the availability of foreign products and technology. Thus, companies and 
workers in the United States bear the burden of the legislation, with their 
foreign competition gaining the benefits-and the target nations, such as 
the Soviet Union, go unscathed. According to the Department of Com-
merce, thousands of products that the United States refuses to ship to the 
Soviet Union are not banned by Cocom and, hence, are available to the 
USSR. 
In the renewal of the EAA, Congress should impose more stringent 
criteria for the President to use in justifying the imposition of export con-
trols and in demonstrating their probable effectiveness. Congress should 
reduce the overall authority of the President to restrict exports for foreign 
policy objectives. The intent of these changes would be to make it diffi-
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cult for the Executive to impose costs on American firms by foregoing 
trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries in the 
absence of compensating national benefits. 
Congress should reduce the overall authority 
of the President to restrict exports for 
foreign policy objectives. 
Other changes in the Export Administration Act could reduce the 
onerousness of the bureaucratic burdens it imposes. For example, a new 
"comprehensive operations license" could be authorized for the use of 
U.S. parent companies in their transactions with foreign affiliates. The 
comprehensive license would eliminate the need for specific approval of 
each shipment to the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. firms. Ex post audit-
ing, with the sanction of license withdrawal, could be relied on. 
Other changes would be more substantive. An example is prohibiting 
the extension of export controls to foreign companies, including U.S. 
overseas subsidiaries and the licensees of U.S. corporations. This change 
would respond to the extraterritoriality concern raised during the ban on 
U.S. participation in the Soviet natural gas pipeline. Without this change, 
the ability to export American research and technology -a rising element 
of our foreign trade in an increasingly service-oriented economy-is 
greatly reduced. 
Regulation of Banking 
The past four years have seen substantial change in the regulatory 
atmosphere in which banks operate. Simultaneously, technological innov-
ation has enabled other institutions, notably investment banking organiza-
tions operating money market funds, to compete more vigorously for 
consumer and business deposits. Two key laws-the Depositary Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. 
Germaine Depositary Institutions Act of 1982-substantially reduced the 
accumulation of detailed governmental regulation of banking. 
Reforming the McFadden Act 
One of the two most important elements of banking regulation on the 
statute books, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, has been modified in recent 
years to accommodate the reality of the 1980s in a manner which has in-
creased competition generally among financial institutions. Some compa-
nies have been hurt by these changes, others have benefitted. On balance, 
consumers have been the major beneficiaries of the regulatory changes. 
The time has come for a serious reconsideration of the second statutory 
pillar of banking regulation, the McFadden Act of 1927. In conjunction 
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with the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Act of 1956, the 
McFadden Act limits the geographic expansion of commercial banks. It 
subjects the branching activities of national banks to the limits imposed 
by each state. The Douglas Amendment effectively prevents bank holding 
companies headquartered in one state from acquiring banks in other 
states. 
The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 established procedures for interstate 
mergers of failing institutions, but only in ''emergency'' conditions or 
where state law specifically allows such applications. Maine and Massa-
chusetts, for example, permit out-of-state bank holding companies to con-
trol in-state banks. Both states require the acquiring company's home 
state to grant reciprocal privileges. The Massachusetts statute also allows 
branching across state lines. But it restricts all interstate bank activity, 
except emergency mergers, to the other New England states. 
Federal banking statutes have limited competition in 
local banking markets, increased concentration of 
institutions, and interfered with the efficient 
allocation of financial capital. 
As in the case of much other economic regulation, the McFadden and 
Douglas statutes are often counterproductive. The intent of the federal 
banking statutes is to prevent a relatively few nationwide financial institu-
tions from dominating banking markets. The result, in practice, has been 
to limit competition in local banking markets, increase concentration of 
banking institutions, and generally interfere with the efficient allocation 
of financial capital. These banking statutes have become obsolete, in part 
as a result of technological and organizational innovations in financial 
institutions. Thus, although banks are limited in their ability to take retail 
deposits to a given state (or designated portion of a state), they have 
found ways to conduct other banking activities, particularly lending, 
across state lines. These interstate functions include the formation of 
bank holding companies, loan production offices, personal finance 
companies, and mortgage banking companies. 
As it turns out, the larger banks are more likely to engage in these 
acceptable methods of scaling the McFadden "walls" prohibiting direct 
interstate banking than are smaller and medium-size firms. The latter 
might be the greatest beneficiary of eliminating the artifical limitations 
contained in the McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment. But, ulti-
mately, the gains from a more efficient and more competitive banking 
system would be received by the customers of banks-depositors and bor-
rowers alike. 
Reforming Social Regulation of Banking 
In recent years, numerous specialized social regulations have been 
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enacted in the banking area. Studies to date do not show that the very 
real costs they impose on the banking system are matched by actual 
consumer benefits. Typically, these new banking statutes have high-
sounding names and, at first blush, worthy objectives. Following the 
enactment of the popular Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968, Congress passed 
in the 1970s a wide variety of social legislation in the banking field. 
Examples include the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the Fair Credit 
Billing Act of 1974, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, the Federal Trade Commission 
Improvements Act of 1975, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, the Consumer 
Leasing Act of 1976, the Debt Collection Practices Act of 1976, the 
Financial Institutions Regulatory Act of 1978, and the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1979. 
Each of these measures has a laudable objective and a high-minded 
title. The earlier statutes were designed to increase the information avail-
able to borrowers. The subsequent laws focused more on influencing 
banking practices to make them more "fair." A close look, however, 
shows that they impose substantial reporting and regulatory costs on the 
banking system. Perhaps the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is the 
best-or worst-example of well-intentioned regulation that is used by 
special interests for other purposes. This statute, a response to the "red-
lining" issue, directs that banks meet the "legitimate" credit needs of 
their communities. 
In determining whether it is meeting this fuzzy objective, a bank must 
carefully define its community. It must then gather and keep extensive 
records on: the community; credit inquiries, applications, and rejections; 
loans made; and the bank's source of deposits. A bank's community rein-
vestment record is taken into account by regulatory agencies that allow or 
prevent the creation of new bank branches, the relocation of facilities, 
and entry into mergers or acquisitions. Various interest groups can 
demand a hearing. 
Congress should reconsider the host of 
social regulations that have been enacted in the 
banking field. Statutes that generate more costs 
than benefits should be amended or repealed. 
One tinintended but nonetheless harmful effect of this procedure is that 
existing banks can and do use it to oppose the entry of new banks. Often, 
community activists in a low-income area use the threat of opposition to 
gain a subsidy from the bank. It is not obvious that the depositors in low-
income areas agree with the activists that their deposits be invested in 
highly risky investments in their general community; they would likely 
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prefer to diversify their risk, just like other investors. Moreover, banks in 
other areas may be willing to spread their risks over a wide geographic 
territory, including the one in question. The Community Reinvestment 
Act is a classic example of Congress trying to do what it thinks is good-
but with other people's money-and, in the process, reducing competition 
and benefitting specific organized groups. 
When the results are examined, CRA and other social regulations seem 
to generate more deficiencies than those which existed under the unregu-
lated situation the laws were designed to replace. Competition in the mar-
ketplace is the most effective way of protecting consumer interests. 
Congress should reconsider the desirability of the host of social regula-
tions that have been enacted in the banking field. Despite the attractive-
ness of the labels attached to them, those regulatory statutes that generate 
more costs than benefits should be amended or repealed. 
Regulation of Marketing 
The most basic question concerning the Federal Trade Commission is 
determining the Commission's role in the economy. The present time is 
opportune for Congress to examine this question and to re-evaluate the 
FTC. 
Over the decade of the 1970s, the FTC interpreted its mandate as being 
a consumer "cop" for the economy. Rulemaking powers were seen as a 
means of restructuring the way in which entire industries did business. 
Examples include requirements for self-regulation of professions by their 
own membership organization, controls over the marketing of used cars, 
and standards for advertising aimed at children ("kid-vid"). In addition, 
the Commission opened major antitrust cases involving the nation's 
largest breakfast cereal manufacturers and the largest oil producers. 
This role deemphasized, but did not replace, previous FTC policy which 
defined unfair practices as those which harmed existing competitors. 
Neither of these policy regimes promotes competition. Policy should be 
grounded in sound principles of avoiding consumer harm and maintaining 
competition. Thus, in contrast to the approach taken in the 1970s, the 
Commission should no longer attempt to be a third party to every major 
transaction in our economy. There are significant benefits from competi-
tion, but these cannot be attained by imposing restrictions that mandate 
only one particular form of competitive interaction. 
Over the decade of the 1970,s, the FTC 
interpreted its mandate as being 
a consumer cccop,, for the economy. 
The example of professional self-regulation illustrates this principle. 
Significant evidence accumulated by economists and other social scientists 
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reveals that this type of regulation -supported by state laws-goes well 
beyond protection of uninformed users of professional services. It also 
includes laws restricting competition which lead to higher consumer prices 
(and higher professional incomes) with little concomitant benefits for 
quality maintenance. 
To its credit, the FTC realized that these restrictions on competition 
harmed consumers, so it launched a plan to challenge those aspects of 
state regulatory control. However, the Commission's actions went well 
beyond this. Under the guise of "deregulation," the Commission sought 
not simply to dismantle this type of regulation, but also to introduce 
regulation of its own. Instead of promoting competition, the Commission 
attempted to replace state limitations on competition with its own restric-
tions. A recent example was the attempt to specify the methods of price 
display to be used by undertakers. 
Congress should define the FTC's role 
as the promotion of competition, knowing 
that, in a healthy economy, individual firms 
and industries come and go. 
The Commission's earlier policy was equally flawed. By equating the 
promotion of competition with the protection of competitors, that policy 
created an economic "museum." This insulation of existing firms from 
the competitive, evolutionary process halts the natural rise and decline of 
firms and industries in a developing economy. Preserving an existing 
structure-making it harder for new firms with modern technology or 
with better ways of satisfying consumer demand to replace older firms-
means that, every year, our economy is a little more outdated relative to 
the techniques used in other nations. Policies of this type have contrib-
uted, and will continue to contribute, to this nation's difficulties in main-
taining its competitiveness in world markets. 
As a second example, consider the FTC's advertising substantiation 
program. While there is a legitimate issue involving fradulent advertising, 
the basic question about restrictions should involve whether consumers 
are harmed. Under current rules, million-dollar law suits are brought 
when there is no obvious issue of consumer harm. For example, a recent 
case involved a grocery chain which claimed that it was selling at the 
lowest prices in the area. The data tended to support the claim. Yet the 
technical legal issue involved whether the grocer could prove this, particu-
larly when different stores carry slightly different merchandise. The legal 
aspect aside, it is difficult to show that any consumer is harmed by such 
claims. 
Congress should define the Commission's role as the promotion of 
competition, with full knowledge that, in a healthy economy, individual 
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firms and industries come and go. This means acknowledging that 
mandating the specific form of competition is inconsistent with promoting 
competition in a dynamic economy. Moreover, attempting to maintain the 
status quo inevitably results in economic retrogression. 
Conclusion 
The status quo in federal regulation is dominated 
by interventions that generate more costly 
government failure than the Hmarket failure, 
they are designed to correct. 
The task of updating regulatory statutes is not a simple one. Desirable 
changes vary with the nature of existing regulation, the specific regulatory 
mechanisms currently in use, and the degree, if any, of shortcomings in 
the unregulated private economy. Rather than developing a uniform 
response, each of the regulatory laws cited here needs to be examined in-
dividually-as we have tried to do. Nevertheless, in the aggregate, greater 
reliance on competition and market forces is extremely desirable. The 
status quo in federal regulation is dominated by those types of interven-
tions that generate more government failure (the costs of regulation) than 
the market failure they are designed to correct (the potential benefits of 
regulation). 
It is also increasingly clear, from the foregoing examination, that 
government intervention generates pressures for more government 
intervention. Thus, regulatory reform-by curtailing or eliminating 
regulations that generate more costs than benefits-could result in 
cumulative advantages to taxpayers and consumers alike. 
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II. Highlights of New Regulatory Data 
Data in the January 1983 federal Budget (covering the period through 
September 1984) provide for an updated review of trends in federal out-
lays for regulation. On the basis of the Budget submitted to Congress, it 
appears that reductions in total regulatory spending made in fiscal year 
1982 (a 3 percent cut) have been followed by a pattern of far more modest 
increases than those which characterized the decade of the 1970s. 
That, at least, is what the "nominal" data show. In "real" terms, when 
the numbers are adjusted to eliminate the effect of inflation, a pattern is 
revealed of reductions in every year since 1980, aggregating to a 14 per-
cent decrease in the real level of federal regulatory outlays over the five-
year period 1980-84. Table 3 contains the highlights of these trends, and 
supporting detail is presented in Table 5 in the Statistical Appendix. 
Similarly, staffing at the major regulatory agencies dropped consid-
erably in 1981 and 1982, and is estimated to fall even further through 
1984. Table 4 shows that the federal regulatory workforce peaked at 
90,000 in 1980. It is scheduled to decline by 16 percent by 1984, when it 
reaches a total of 76,000. Details are contained in Table 6 in the 
Appendix. 
Cutbacks in Regulatory Spending 
Table 3 illustrates that in 1970, a relatively modest $800 million was 
spent by the federal government to administer the regulatory activities of 
the 42 major agencies that were then operative. By 1975 that amount had 
risen by 300 percent, to over $3.2 billion. By 1980 regulatory outlays had 
risen even further, to nearly $6 billion. Total spending by the major agen-
cies grew more than sixfold over these eleven years-a period during 
which other budget items such as outlays for the Defense Department and 
total annual Social Security benefit payments rose by only 74 percent and 
278 percent, respectively. In constant dollars, adjusted for inflation, this 
growth was equally dramatic; regulatory budgets grew by 274 percent in 
real terms from 1970 to 1980, reaching nearly $3 billion in 1970 dollars. 
The long-term trend of rising federal outlays for regulation was 
reversed in fiscal years 1981 and 1982. In the first year of the Reagan 
Administration, modest changes were made in regulatory outlays slated 
by the Carter Administration. The total of $6.5 billion represented a 9 
percent increase over 1980 (rather than a projected 10 percent) and 
roughly equalled that year's rate of inflation. In real terms, 1981 spending 
actually represented a 0.1 percent decrease over that of the previous year. 
In fiscal 1982, the drop in regulatory budgets was clear-cut and unprec-
edented. In current dollars, spending decreased 3 percent, to $6.2 billion; 
in constant dollars it fell 8.6 percent. This turn toward austerity in the 
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occurred in data collected by the Center for the Study of American Busi-
ness for the previous twelve years. 
Estimates for regulatory spending in fiscal 1983 and 1984 show further 
declines in constant-dollar outlays. As indicated in Table 3, total budgets 
for 1983 are projected to drop 2.3 percent (in 1970 dollars) and another 
3.9 percent in fiscal 1984. In current-dollar terms, spending should rise 3 
percent and 1 percent in these years, respectively. In the five-year period 
1980-1984, the estimated administrative cost of regulation is projected to 
rise 10 percent, not accounting for inflation, to almost $6.5 billion. In 
constant dollars, however, the decrease will amount to 14 percent. 
In constant dollars, regulatory budgets 
nearly quadrupled between 1970 and 1980. 
Specific details of the regulatory budgets are worth noting. For exam-
ple, between 1970 and 1980, spending on various forms of social regula-
tion increased over nine-fold, far outstripping outlays for the traditional 
forms of economic regulation, which rose 195 percent. Thus, emphasis 
was placed during the 1970s on regulation of business activities that affect 
society at large-consumer safety and health, job safety, environmental 
conditions-rather than on control of the economic activities of specific 
industries such as airlines, trucking, communications, and banking and 
financial institutions. In the first half of the 1980s, however, federal 
outlays for economic regulation are continuing to rise rapidly (up 21 per-
cent), while budgets for social regulation will be rising more slowly, up 
only 8 percent. 
Spending for Economic Regulation 
Details of specific agency budgets in the category of economic regula-
tion can be found details shown in Table 5 in the Appendix. The follow-
ing are highlights of spending trends for economic regulation. 
1. Regulation of finance and banking will show a 48 percent increase in 
spending, the largest proportional rise of any budget category. Much of 
this increase may be attributable to the current state of the economy. For 
example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) will increase out-
lays by 250 percent-the largest rise for any federal regulatory agency. 
One arm of this agency is the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration (FSLIC), which examines savings and loan institutions. Sizeable 
growth is also planned for the Farm Credit Administration (with a 75 per-
cent increase in spending), the National Credit Union Administration (up 
more than 35 percent), and the Comptroller of the Currency (up nearly 38 
percent), which regulates national banks. 
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2. Industry-specific regulation is an exception to the increased emphasis 
on economic regulation in 1980s, since budgets in this area are projected 
to decline in 1984 by 6 percent over 1980. However, much of this decrease 
is attributable to cutbacks at the only two federal agencies experiencing 
substantial deregulation. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), with a bud-
get drop of more than one third over the five years, is continuing to phase 
out its operations under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The agency 
will be abolished as of January 1, 1985. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) will reduce its spending by more than one fourth over this 
period, in accordance with deregulatory actions affecting surface trans-
portation brought about by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, the Staggers 
Rail Act of 1980, the Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, and 
the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982. 
Two industry-specific agencies will increase spending substantially. The 
budget for Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 1984 will 
be 50 percent larger than it was in 1980 in order to increase surveillance of 
and research on commodity and options markets and to broaden its inves-
tigative and litigative actions. Also, the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (PERC), which regulates the interstate pricing of natural gas and 
the hydroelectric, oil pipeline, and electric power industries, will receive 
an increased budget of nearly 40 percent over this five-year period. 
Regulatory agency budgets are on the decline 
in the 1980s-a 14 percent reduction in 
real terms from 1980 to 1984. 
3. The broad category of general business regulation will show a budget 
increase of more than one fourth by 1984-from $310 million to $390 
million-part of which will derive from a stronger policy emphasis on 
U.S. trade in world markets. Spending for the International Trade Com-
mission (lTC) will rise 50 percent between 1980 and 1984 to strengthen 
research, investigations and reports relating to international trade and 
economic policy. Budgets for the International Trade Administration in 
the Department of Commerce will likewise rise 50 percent in this period in 
order to focus greater attention on the improper transfer of U.S. tech-
nology worldwide and to develop a computerized tracking system for ex-
port licensing applications. In a separate area, the Patent and Trademark 
Office, also within Commerce, will increase spending by 62 percent to 
reduce its backlog of patent and trademark applications through extensive 
use of automation. 
Budget Trends in Social Regulation 
Areas of social regulation include several of the largest, most prominent 
and most heavily funded regulatory agencies in the federal government. 
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In general, growth in these areas will be modest, and in some cases signifi-
cant budget cutbacks are projected. The much slower growth in social regu-
lation is partly due to the budget slowdown at the Department of Energy. 
Other details (derived from Table 5) follow. 
4. Several agencies in the category of consumer safety and health will 
experience cuts in spending by 1984. The Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission (CPSC) will undergo a budget reduction of more than 20 percent 
from the 1980 figure. In spite of this, the Commission will actually 
increase spending by more than one fourth in the areas of ''hazards 
programs'' and ''information and education'' between 1981 and 1984. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) will 
reduce spending by one fifth in the five-year period, but this cut is pro-
jected for the agency's general administration outlays rather than in 
programs for rulemaking, enforcement, research and highway safety. 
A cutback of one third in the Federal Highway Administration's budgets 
reflects, in large measure, the phasing out of the highway beautification 
program. Overall, consumer safety and health programs will increase 
slightly (8 percent) in current dollar terms, from $2.3 billion to $2.5 
billion. 
The EPA, the largest of all regulatory agencies 
in terms of both budgets and staffing, will 
experience a 1.3 percent increase in its 
regulatory outlays by 1984. 
5. Spending on regulation of job safety and other working conditions 
will rise by 13 percent by 1984, the largest increase of any area of social 
regulation. Budgets for both the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) will increase about one sixth during the five-year period. The 
largest percentage rise in outlays (22 percent) will be at the National 
Labor Relations Board. 
6. The only agency in the category of environmental and energy 
regulation to be slated for substantial funding increases is the Office of 
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement in the Department of the 
Interior. Its outlays will increase from $85 million in 1980 to $180 million 
in 1984. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the largest of all federal 
regulatory agencies in terms 'of both budgets and staffing, will experience 
only a 1.3 percent increase in its regulatory outlays by 1984, bringing its 
budget (excluding construction grants) in that year to $1.3 billion. Outlays 
for environmental regulation programs will be significantly lower than 
they were in 1981. In fact, in the period 1981-84, the agency's spending on 
research and development will drop well over one fourth, and budgets for 
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major pollution and abatement programs-air, water, hazardous wastes, 
pesticides, and toxic substances-will all decrease, some by as much as 20 
to 24 percent. Cuts in the water quality program will total 47 percent. 
A related agency, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), will be 
subject to an 83 percent cut in spending, the largest percentage decrease 
of any regulatory agency shown in Table 5. The endangered species pro-
gram of the Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior 
will be reduced by 15 percent. 
Although prospects are now dim that the Department of Energy (DOE) 
will be dismantled, the President's order to decontrol the pricing and 
distribution of petroleum (issued in January 1981) has substantially 
reduced the Department's regulatory expenditures. Outlays for energy 
regulation will drop 77 percent by 1984, to less than $40 million. 
There will be one fewer regulator employed 
in the federal government in 1984 for every 
six that were employed in 1980. 
The Decline in Regulatory Staffing 
The most dramatic reversal of the regulatory trends of the 1970s is 
shown in Tables 4 and 6. The number of people working in full-time, 
permanent positions in the major agencies is projected to continue to 
decline through 1984. If estimates hold true, there will be one fewer 
regulator employed in the federal government in 1984 for every six that 
were employed in 1980-a five-year reduction of 16 percent. 
This decline in manpower contrasts sharply with the overall trend of the 
1970s. In the period 1970-1975, staffing at the major agencies increased 
168 percent, growing from over 27,600 positions to just over 74,000. 
Further increases in the next five years brought total staffing to an all-
time high of 90,500 in 1980-more than a twofold increase. 
In 1981, however, brakes were applied to the growth of the regulatory 
workforce. Staffing dropped by 4 percent in that year and by an addition-
al 8 percent in fiscal 1982. Further reductions in force of 3 percent in 1983 
and 1 percent in 1984 are expected to bring staffing at the major agencies 
to below 76,500-nearly the number of people employed in 1975. 
Of the 44 agencies (shown in Table 6 in the Appendix) for which regu-
latory staffing levels can be determined, only a handful plan increases. 
Overall, staffing in areas of social regulation will decline by one sixth 
from 1980 to 1984. Only four social regulatory agencies plan modest 
increases-the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service, the National Labor Relations Board and 
the Inspector for the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System. The 
largest reductions are projected for the various agricultural inspection 
services (3,600 fewer employees), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
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Firearms (approximately 1,000 fewer employees), the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (a reduction in force of 660), the Economic 
Regulatory Administration in the Department of Energy (nearly 1,900 
fewer positions), and the Environmental Protection Agency (nearly 2,000 
fewer employees). 
Administration efforts to reduce the size 
and costs of the regulatory establishment 
are not q substitute for substantive changes in 
the statutes that empower agencies. 
Economic regulation will experience total staffing cuts of roughly one 
tenth during the period 1980-1984. Only one agency, the Patent and 
Trademark Office in the Department of Commerce, will increase employ-
ment-by 550 employees, or 20 percent of the 1980 staffing. The largest 
personnel reduction, in percentage terms, will be made in the soon to be 
abolished Civil Aeronautics Board, where staffing will be cut in half. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission will have the largest reduction in force, 
however. It will reduce its staffing by 740 employees, or one third its 1980 
level. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will reduce its 
employment by nearly one fifth (400 fewer personnel). 
The Outlook for Regulatory Growth 
The efforts of the Reagan Administration to reduce the size and costs 
of the federal government's regulatory establishment are not a substitute 
for making substantive changes in the statutes that empower the agencies. 
Nevertheless, cutbacks in budgets and staffing can have important effects. 
The public's increasing awareness of the exceptional growth of the nation's 
regulatory bureaucracy has alerted many policymakers to the need for a 
sense of balance in federal activities that control the workings of private 
enterprise. 
If current trends hold, the 1980s will constitute 
a new era of restraint in the financing of 
regulation and the workforce devoted to it. 
The larger issue in this regard, however, is the ability of regulatory 
agencies to perform their valid functions in a manner that does not bring 
about the wasteful use of valuable resources or create adverse effects that 
outweigh the benefits. Elected representatives and their constituents have 
come to realize that merely funding and staffing an agency does not ensure 
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that it will perform its functions well or that the intended objectives will 
be achieved. 
The course of future regulation of the private sector is no more predict-
able now than it has been in the past. For the time being, however, 
budgetary moderation and a small measure of austerity now characterize 
the activities of federal agencies that often exercise great control over 
people and jobs, products and incomes, and profit and loss. The data 
presented in this section of this report indicate that the 1980s will consti-
tute-if current trends hold-anew era of restraint in the financing of 
regulation and the workforce devoted to it. 
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Ill. Statistical Appendix 
Note on the Data 
Budget figures for the 55 major regulatory agencies shown in Table 5 
(and summarized in Table 3) consist of outlays for fiscal years. These 
expenditures are rounded to the nearest million. Total regulatory budget 
figures are slightly underestimated, since regulatory outlays for three 
agencies cannot be identified separately. These are the Small Business 
Administration, the Foreign Agricultural Service in the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Materials Transportation Bureau in the Department 
of Transportation. 
All staffing figures shown in Table 6 (and summarized in Table 4) 
consist only of permanent, full-time positions in each agency. Total 
staffing is also underestimated, since the number of employees assigned to 
regulatory activities in 14 agencies cannot be identified separately from 
aggregate figures for the agencies. In other cases, regulatory staffing for 
certain agencies in certain years was not available (shown as n/a). 
Budget and staffing data are compiled from the annual issues of the 
Budget of the United States Government, including the Appendix. 
Agencies that primarily perform taxation, subsidy, and credit functions 
are excluded from these regulatory data. Examples of these organizations 
are the Internal Revenue Service, the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
and the Federal Housing Administration. Agencies that administer federal 
contracts and procurement procedures are likewise excluded. In data 
previously compiled in the Center's Directory of Federal Regulatory 
Agencies (of which this document is an extension}, the Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service in the Department of Agriculture 




Expenditures by Federal Regulatory Agencies 
(Fiscal Years, Millions of Dollars) 
Agency 
(Estimated) 
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
SOCIAL REGULATION 
Consumer Safety and health 
Consumer Production 
Safety Commission ............... $ 34 $ 44 $ 41 $ 34 $ 35 $ 35 
Department of Agriculture: 
Agricultural Marketing Service .... 131 36 40 44 52 51 48 
Animal and Plant 
w Health Inspection Service .... .. 343 263 306 316 280 237 
~ Federal Grain Inspection Service .. 26 29 11 6 7 
Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (a) ......... 360 377 320 329 335 
Packers and 
Stockyards Administration .... . 8 9 9 
Subtotal .................... . $131 $379 $689 $756 $707 $675 $636 
Department of Health 
and Human Services: 
Food and Drug Administration ... . 68 201 326 337 340 357 379 
Department of Housing 
and Urban Development: 
Consumer Protection Programs (b) 13 5 4 8 6 
Department of Justice: 
Antitrust Division ............... 9 18 49 49 43 44 45 
Drug Enforcement Administration. nla 12 13 13 15 16 16 
Subtotal .................... $ 9 $ 30 $ 62 $ 62 $ 58 $ 60 $ 61 
(Estimated) 
Agency 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Consumer Safety and Health (cont.) 
Department of Transportation: 
Coast Guard ................... $ 57 $ 162 $ 444 $ 571 $ 580 $ 610 $ 646 
Federal Aviation Administration .. nla 178 252 269 263 303 292 
Federal Highway Administration .. nla 36 36 31 22 30 24 
Federal Railroad Administration .. 4 9 28 29 25 31 27 
National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration ............... 32 75 105 125 82 87 84 
Subtotal .................. $ 93 $ 460 $ 865 $1025 $ 972 $1061 $1073 
Department of the Treasury: 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (c) .................. nla $ 95 $ 146 $ 147 $ 143 $ 151 $ 159 
Customs Service ............... 20 71 116 85 88 96 96 
w Subtotal .................. $ 20 $ 166 $ 262 $ 232 $ 231 $ 247 $ 255 
Vl 
National Transportation Safety 
Board ......................... 5 9 18 18 17 19 20 
Total-Consumer Safety and Health $ 326 $1279 $2279 $2476 $2363 $2462 $2465 
Job Safety and Other Working 
Conditions 
Department of Labor: 
Employment Standards 
Administration ............. . . nla $ 72 $ 114 $ 116 $ 106 $ 114 $ 120 
Labor-Management Services 
Administration ............... 12 27 52 56 55 56 63 
Mine Safety and Health 
Administration ............... nla 68 142 152 139 155 149 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration ............... 90 178 195 194 203 207 
Subtotal .................. $ 12 $ 257 $ 486 $ 519 $ 494 $ 528 $ 539 
(Estimated) 
Agency 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Job Safety and Other Working 
Conditions (cont.) 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ................... 12 56 131 134 138 146 154 
National Labor Relations Board ..... 38 61 109 114 119 123 133 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission ............ 5 8 8 7 6 6 
Total- Job Safety and Other Working 
Conditions .................... $ 62 $ 379 $ 734 $ 775 $ 758 $ 803 $ 832 
Environment and Energy 
Council on Environmental Quality ... n/a 3 6 3 2 2 
Department of Defense: 
Army Corps of Engineers ........ 2 16 41 42 45 47 47 
w 
Energy Activities [Department of 
0"1 Energy]: 
Economic Regulatory 
Administration ............... 6 132 62 65 52 25 
Petroleum Regulation ........... 69 17 14 12 
Subtotal • • •••• 0. 0 •••••• 0. 0 $ $ 6 $ 132 $ 131 $ 82 $ 66 $ 37 
Department of Interior: 
Fish and Wildlife Service ......... n/a 6 20 22 19 21 17 
Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement .. 85 131 119 141 180 
Subtotal ••• 0 0 •• 0 •• 0. 0 ••••• n/a $ 6 $ 105 $ 153 $ 138 $ 162 $ 197 
Environmental Protection Agency .. . 71 850 1259 1360 1324 1270 1275 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission .... 12 86 378 417 442 466 467 
Office of the Federal Inspector for 
the Alaska Natural Gas 
Transportation System .......... 5 16 15 10 8 
Total- Environment and Energy .... $ 85 $ 967 $1926 $2122 $2048 $2023 $2032 
TOTAL SOCIAL REGULATION ...... 473 2625 4939 5373 5169 5288 5329 
(Estimated) 
Agency 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
ECONOMIC REGULATION 
Finance and Banking 
Department of the Treasury: 
Comptroller of the Currency ...... $ 32 $ 65 $ 113 $ 121 $ 129 $ 144 $ 150 
Farm Credit Administration ........ 4 6 12 13 15 18 21 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 0 .... 0. 0. 0 ••••• 0. 0 •• 39 66 116 124 131 142 149 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board .... 21 33 20 60 63 70 70 
Federal Reserve System Board of 
Governors ..................... 3 6 12 13 13 14 15 
National Credit Union Administration 7 10 17 21 20 22 23 
Total- Finance and Banking ....... $ 106 $ 186 $ 290 $ 352 $ 371 $ 410 $ 428 
Industry-Specific Regulation 
Civil Aeronautics Board ........... $ 48 $ 81 $ 117 $ 147 $ 110 $ 79 $ 72 
w Commodity Futures Trading 
.......] Commission ................... 16 18 21 22 24 
Federal Communications 
Commission ................... 24 48 76 81 80 83 86 
Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission .... . .............. 18 34 67 70 80 81 93 
Federal Maritime Commission ...... 4 7 11 12 11 12 11 
Interstate Commerce Commission .. 27 46 79 75 67 64 58 
Renegotiation Board (c) ............ 4 5 
Total-Industry-Specific Regulation . $ 125 $ 222 $ 366 $ 403 $ 369 $ 341 $ 344 
General Business 
Cost Accounting Standards Board (d) n/a 
Council on Wage and Price 
Stability (e) .................... 9 6 
Department of Commerce: 
International Trade Administration 4 26 30 35 39 39 
Patent and Trademark Office ..... 49 71 103 112 129 154 167 






Agency 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
General Business (cont.) 
Federal Election Commission 10 9 9 10 10 
Federal Trade Commission ......... 20 39 68 70 68 65 60 
International Trade Commission .... 4 8 14 16 17 21 21 
Library of Congress: 
Copyright Office ................ 2 4 4 4 5 5 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission ................... 22 44 74 78 79 90 92 
Total-General Business .......... $ 96 $ 169 $ 309 $ 325 $ 341 $ 384 $ 394 
TOTAL- ECONOMIC REGULATION . 327 577 965 1080 1081 1135 1166 
GRAND TOTAL ................... $ 800 $3202 $5904 $6453 $6250 $6423 $6495 
* = less than $500,000 
- = agency was not operational 
nla = not available 
Notes: 
(a) Formerly Food Safety and Quality Service. The budget for this agency has been revised to exclude "Funds for Strengthening Markets, 
Income and Supply (Sec. 32)." 
(b) Budgets for 1980-81 are for the Office of Neighborhoods, Voluntary Associations, and Consumer Protection, since abolished. 
(c) Renegotiation Board abolished in 1979. 
(d) CASB abolished in 1980. 
(e) COWPS abolished in 1981. 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business 
TABLE 6 
Staffing of Federal Regulatory Agencies 
(Fiscal Years, Permanent Full-Time Positions) 
Agency 1970 1975 1980 
(Estimated) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
SOCIAL REGULATION 
Consumer Safety and Health 
Consumer Product Safety 
Commission ................... 890 871 812 631 577 542 Department of Agriculture: 
Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service ............ 14613 4398 4610 4592 4592 4533 Federal Grain Inspection Service .. 821 659 76 113 153 Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (a) ................... 13213 12411 9951 9902 9902 Packers and Stockyards 
Administration ............... 207 200 200 
Subtotal .................. 14613 18432 17680 14826 14807 14788 
Department of Health and Human 
Services: 
Food and Drug Administration .... 4152 6206 7419 7521 7377 7185 7188 Department of Justice: 
Antitrust Division ............... 595 712 939 939 829 742 704 Department of Transportation: 
Federal Highway Administration .. nla 229 292 271 271 271 271 Federal Railroad Administration .. 246 369 484 431 421 445 445 National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration ............... 518 881 874 797 686 617 617 
Subtotal .................. 764 1479 1650 1499 1378 1333 1333 
(Estimated) 
Agency 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Consumer Safety and Health (cont.) 
Department of the Treasury: 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms .................... 4123 3900 3671 3671 2950 2974 
National Transportation and Safety 335 Board ....... .. ... . .... .. ...... 275 310 388 359 359 335 
Total- Consumer Safety and Health. 5786 28333 33599 32481 29071 27929 27864 
Job Safety and Other Working 
Conditions 
Department of Labor: 
Labor-Management Services 1117 1248 Administration ............... 860 1353 1325 1308 1040 
Mine Safety and Health 3408 3184 
,J:::.. Administration (b) ....... . .... 2940 3857 3808 3763 
0 Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration ............ . .. 2471 3015 3009 2354 2354 2355 
Subtotal . . ................ 860 6764 8197 8125 7157 68Z9 6787 
Equal Employment Opportunity 3000 3100 Commission ................... 780 2384 3433 3412 3137 
National Labor Relations Board ..... 2281 2573 3157 3213 3213 3213 3213 
Occupational Safety and Health 113 96 Review Commission ............ 172 165 160 126 
Total- Job Safety and Other Working 13205 13196 Conditions . . . . .. . . . ........... 3921 11893 14952 14910 13633 
Environment and Energy 
Council on Environmental Quality ... n/a 50 32 16 15 15 13 
Department of Defense: 725 700 Army Corps of Engineers ........ n/a 613 800 800 750 
(Estimated) 
Agency 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Environment and Energy (cont.) 
Energy Activites [Department of 
Energy]: 
Economic Regulatory 
Administration ............... n/a 2161 1383 597 441 300 
Department of Interior: 
Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement .. 1025 1036 735 731 731 
Environmental Protection Agency ... n/a 9203 10678 9799 9364 9125 8669 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission .... n/a 2006 3041 3029 3315 3280 3235 
Office of the Federal Inspector for 
the Alaska Natural Gas 
Transportation System .......... 101 189 106 40 130 
,J:::.. 
Total- Environment and Energy .... n/a 11872 17838 16252 14882 14357 13778 
-
TOTAL-SOCIAL REGULATION ..... 9707 52098 66389 63643 57586 55491 54838 
ECONOMIC REGULATION 
Finance and Banking 
Department of the Treasury: 
Comptroller of the Currency ...... 1920 2546 3331 3071 3071 2925 2905 
Farm Credit Administration ........ 225 229 245 267 284 287 287 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation ................... 2669 3164 3691 3554 3435 3554 3554 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board .... 933 904 1388 1440 1447 1451 1437 
National Credit Union Administration 456 570 650 601 613 614 614 
Total- Finance and Banking ....... 6203 7413 9305 8933 8850 8831 8797 
~ 
N 
Agency 1970 1975 1980 
Industry-Specific Regulation 
Civil Aeronautics Board ........... 685 718 743 
Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission ................... 496 550 
Federal Communications 
Commission ................... 1637 2020 2153 
Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission ................... 1162 1320 1605 
Federal Maritime Commission ...... 250 319 361 
Interstate Commerce Commission .. 1907 2142 1940 
Renegotiation Board (c) ............ 233 200 
Total-Industry-Specific Regulation 5874 7215 7352 
General Business 
Cost Accounting Standards Board (d) n/a 42 28 
Council on Wage and Price 
Stability (e) .................... 41 233 
Department of Commerce: 
Patent and Trademark Office ..... 2795 3014 2734 
Federal Election Commission ...... 62 251 
Federal Trade Commission ......... 1385 1569 1665 
International Trade Commission (f) .. 265 408 438 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission ................... 1432 2144 2100 
Total-General Business 5877 7280 7449 
TOTAL ECONOMIC REGULATION ... 17954 21908 24106 
GRAND TOTAL ................... 27661 74006 90495 
* = less than $500,000 
- = agency was not operational 
n/a = not available 
Notes: 
(a) 1980 figure is for the Food Safety and Quality Service. 
(b) 1975 figure is for the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration. 
(c) Abolished in 1979. 
(d) Abolished in 1980. 
(e) Abolished in 1981. 
(f) 1970 figure is for the Tariff Commission. 
Source: Center for the Study of American Business 
(Estimated) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
650 498 434 366 
550 550 550 550 
2004 1862 1896 1896 
1607 1516 1667 1701 
306 306 290 252 
1836 1662 1378 1200 
6953 6394 6215 5965 
115 
2834 3036 3140 3286 
235 219 234 234 
1587 1322 1168 1131 
438 413 438 438 
1928 1925 1900 1700 
7137 6915 6880 6789 
23023 22159 21926 21551 
86666 79745 77417 76389 
